Hegel's Master/Slave Dialectic

Our reading from Hegel's Phenomenology of Mind can be divided into two related parts. In part one, Hegel begins with a discussion of self-consciousness, which is easiest to talk about in terms of "Person A" and "Person B" (although Hegel does not use this terminology). Hegel argues that Person A's self-consciousness only exists because he is "recognized" by Person B (paragraph 178). Person A doesn't see Person B as a self-consciousness in his own right, but only as a reflection of himself; in other words, Person B isn't real to Person A (179). Person A and Person B need each other for recognition, but are not yet aware of this (182-184). Because they are unwilling to acknowledge that their self-consciousnesses are interdependent, they engage in a life and death struggle in an effort to achieve autonomy (187). This struggle to the death is necessary because it puts both Person A and Person B's status as a conscious being at risk. Because Person A and Person B realize that in killing one another, they actually kill themselves, they decide the struggle to the death is futile.

So, Person A (now the Master) decides to enslave Person B (now the slave) in an effort to assure that he is recognized by another. Hegel argues the master is an independent being who lives only for himself, while the slave, or bondsman, is dependent and lives for another (189). The bondsman is considered a thing to the master and is subordinate. At the same time, the master forces the bondsman to make things that the master can enjoy (190). However, because the bondsman has the creative power to make things, over time he becomes more independent through his work. He thus finds recognition away from his master, and finds a "mind of his own" (195-96).

For those of you who want to read more about Hegel and his historical context, check out Susan Buck-Morss, "Hegel and Haiti," Critical Inquiry, Vol. 26, No.4 (2000). You can access this online by logging into JSTOR through the Gelman Library website.